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In this paper, we consider continuous-variable quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols which
use non-Gaussian modulations. These specific modulation schemes are compatible with very efficient
error-correction procedures, hence allowing the protocols to outperform previous protocols in terms
of achievable range. In their simplest implementation, these protocols are secure for any linear
quantum channels (hence against Gaussian attacks). We also show how the use of decoy states
makes the protocols secure against arbitrary collective attacks, which implies their unconditional
security in the asymptotic limit.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first potentially real-life application of the emerg-
ing field of quantum information is arguably quantum
key distribution (QKD) which allows two distant par-
ties to establish a secret key over an a priori unsecure
communication channel [1]. The importance of a QKD
protocol is usually measured through three main criteria:
its practicality, its performance and its security.
Among all existing protocols, those based on contin-
uous variables appear quite appealing from a practical
point of view [2]. For instance, the protocol GG02 [3]
simply requires the preparation of coherent states and
their detection via homodyne (or heterodyne) detection.
Moreover, the security of this protocol is established
against collective attacks [4–6] which are optimal in the
asymptotic limit [7]. There exist different ways to quan-
tify the performance of a given protocol, but the usual
figure of merit is the secret key rate that can be achieved
as a function of the distance. Continuous-variable proto-
cols such as GG02 perform quite well for short distances,
but seem unfortunately limited to much shorter distances
than their discrete-variable counterparts (see Fig. 4 of
Ref. [1] for a comparison of the performance of various
protocols). In particular, while discrete-variable proto-
cols allow one to distribute secret keys over distances
larger than 100 km, GG02 has only be implemented for
a distance of 25 km [8, 9] and there is not much hope of
increasing its range well beyond 50 km [10].
In this paper, we introduce continuous-variable (CV)
QKD protocols which share the practicality and security
of GG02, but greatly improve its performance, especially
in terms of achievable distance.
In Section II, we quickly review the status of current
CV protocols. In Section III, we present the specific mod-
ulation schemes of our protocols. We then introduce the
concept of decoy states for CV QKD protocols in Section
IV. In Section V, we prove the security of our proto-
cols against collective attacks and we finally discuss their
performance in Section VI.
II. LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT CV
PROTOCOLS
Proving the security of a QKD protocol is usually a dif-
ficult task, but the situation is even worse for continuous-
variable QKD protocols, because the relevant Hilbert
space is infinite dimensional. The task is difficult for (at
least) one specific reason: the bipartite state ρAB shared
by Alice and Bob (in the entanglement-based version of
the protocol) has an infinite number of degrees of free-
dom. This means that a full tomography of this state
is hopeless, even in the case of collective attacks, where
Alice and Bob share many copies of the same state.
Fortunately, one can take advantage of extremality
properties of Gaussian states [11] to show that the eaves-
dropper’s information is upper-bounded by the informa-
tion she would have if Alice and Bob shared instead the
state ρGAB, the Gaussian state with the same first two
moments as ρAB [4–6]. Hence, knowing the first two
moments of the state ρAB, that is, a finite number of pa-
rameters, is sufficient to bound Eve’s information. Fur-
thermore, taking advantage of specific symmetries of the
protocols in phase-space [12], it is possible to reduce this
number to only three, namely the variances of Alice and
Bob’s reduced states and the covariance. That so few
parameters are indeed sufficient to bound Eve’s informa-
tion is quite remarkable, but it should be noted that this
is also a necessity if one wants to take finite-size effects
into account. Indeed, it was shown in [13] that estimat-
ing these parameters with a precision compatible with
a secret key rate is already very challenging in terms of
resources.
Because of the constraints imposed by finite-size ef-
fects, the only theoretical tool presently available to prove
the security of a continuous-variable QKD protocol is
therefore this Gaussian optimality. This technique un-
fortunately comes at a price, namely that if the true
2quantum state ρAB is not sufficiently close to a Gaussian
state, then the bound on Eve’s information will not be
tight enough to still get secret bits at the end of the pro-
tocol. By construction, this bound is indeed only tight
for Gaussian states, and it turns out that it degrades very
rapidly as the non-Gaussianity of the state (and conse-
quently of the protocol) increases.
This observation leads us to the unavoidable conclusion
that with the theoretical techniques available today, pro-
tocols using a Gaussian modulation (i.e. GG02, possibly
with a heterodyne detection [14]) are optimal among all
continuous-variable QKD protocols, and using any other
modulation scheme can only lead to worse performances
[33].
A natural question then arises: why should one con-
sider new protocols involving specific non-Gaussian mod-
ulations since theoretically, they cannot beat a Gaussian
modulation? The reason is that, in practice, protocols
with a Gaussian modulation do not perform as well as
expected, especially with regards to long distance com-
munication. This is due to the fact that error-correction
is very hard to implement for a Gaussian modulation,
thereby making the effective secret key rate drop to zero
at distances of the order of 50 km, even if the theoretical
key rate is strictly positive.
The protocols we introduce in the present paper out-
perform previous protocols in terms of maximal range.
This is achieved thanks to a combination of two facts:
first, the specific modulation schemes allow one to extract
information much more efficiently than with a Gaussian
modulation ; second, there is a regime (for the variance
of the modulation) where the protocols are still signif-
icantly close to a Gaussian protocol, hence making the
bound on Eve’s information tight enough to be useful.
III. NEW MODULATION SCHEMES
The main argument for switching from a Gaussian
modulation to a non-Gaussian one is not because it might
make the eavesdropping more difficult (available theoret-
ical tools are not powerful enough to answer this ques-
tion). The reason is that present coding techniques do
not allow for a very efficient reconciliation procedure at
(very) low Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) when Alice’s data
are Gaussian. Remember that a QKD protocol typically
consists of three phases: first, Alice and Bob exchange
quantum signal, perform measurements and obtain cor-
related classical data, say vectors x and y; second, in
the reconciliation step, they use classical error correction
techniques to agree on a common (errorless) bit string u,
and finally, they apply privacy amplification to obtain a
secure key from u.
The importance of the reconciliation phase is specific
to continuous-variable protocols for two reasons. First,
one has to deal with continuous values for both Alice
and Bob’s variables instead of bits, which is rather un-
usual in the field of digital communication. Indeed, even
when analog signals are used to transmit information on
noisy (classical) channels, the modulation is almost al-
ways discrete and not continuous. The second reason is
that contrary to discrete-variable QKD protocols where
the error rate is always below some small constant (to
guarantee the security of the protocol), the SNR can be
arbitrarily small for continuous-variable protocols (and is
actually very small as one tries to increase the range of
the protocol [34]).
For continuous-variable QKD protocols, information is
encoded in phase space, in general in the quadratures
of coherent states [35]. More precisely, if the classical
information she wants to send is described by a vector
x = (x1, x2, · · · , x2n), then Alice prepares the n coher-
ent states |x1 + ix2〉, · · · , |x2n−1 + ix2n〉 and sends them
through the quantum channel.
There are two possibilities concerning the detection:
Bob can perform either homodyne or heterodyne mea-
surements. In the case of a homodyne detection, for each
state, Bob chooses randomly which quadrature to mea-
sure. He then obtains an n-dimensional classical vector y
and later informs Alice of his choices of quadratures. In
the case of a heterodyne detection, Bob ends up with a
2n-dimensional vector y. Hence, Alice and Bob share
twice as many data for the heterodyne protocol than
for the homodyne one. However, a heterodyne detec-
tion adds 3 dB of noise to the data, and in practice the
performances of both schemes are quite similar.
In order to complete the key distribution, two addi-
tional steps are required. First Alice and Bob proceed
with the reconciliation of their classical data in order to
agree on a common bit string u. Here, we restrict our-
selves to a reverse reconciliation [15], meaning that only
Bob can send classical information to Alice (in contrast
to direct reconciliation where Alice would send some side-
information to help Bob correct his errors). Second, they
use privacy amplification in order to obtain a secret key
from u: this can only be done once they have an upper
bound on Eve’s information about u.
In this paper, we consider protocols for which the rec-
onciliation can be performed efficiently (which is not the
case of the protocols using a Gaussian modulation), and
for which Eve’s information can be bounded if she is re-
stricted to collective attacks. Security against general at-
tacks (“unconditional security”) is then obtained in the
asymptotic limit, thanks to a de Finetti representation
theorem for infinite-dimensional quantum systems [7].
To be more specific, the protocols considered here are
characterized as the ones for which the reverse recon-
ciliation problem can be reduced to the channel cod-
ing problem for the binary-input additive white Gaus-
sian noise (BI-AWGN) channel, which can itself be tack-
led with standard techniques (efficient error correcting
codes). One such protocol is the four-state protocol con-
sidered in [16], but it turns out that other, more efficient,
continuous modulation schemes are also possible.
3A. Homodyne detection : four-state modulation
Let us consider protocols involving a homodyne de-
tection. In this case, the protocols of interest display
a discrete modulation with either 2 or 4 states, and a
basic problem is how to evaluate the transmission chan-
nel, and thereby Eve’s information. Such a problem does
not arise for Gaussian modulations, because the vari-
ances and covariances directly measured by Alice and
Bob give a covariance matrix, which is all that is needed
to characterize the worst possible attack by Eve, which is
a Gaussian attack according to the Gaussian optimality
theorem. On the other hand, for a non-Gaussian modula-
tion, the noises and correlations measured by Alice and
Bob cannot be directly connected to a relevant covari-
ance matrix, and the Gaussian optimality theorem does
not apply directly.
Among possible approaches, two-state protocols were
studied in [17], and the authors proved the security of
the protocols against any collective attacks, but with the
caveat that a complete tomography of the state was re-
quired. In [16, 18], the authors considered the noises and
correlations measured by Alice and Bob from their non-
Gaussian modulation, and then considered the Gaussian
attacks associated with these values as optimal. However,
this approach has the implicit assumption that the trans-
mission channel can be considered as linear, which means
that it is intrinsically characterized by a transmission T
and an excess noise ξ (see details in Appendix A). Gaus-
sian channels are obvious examples of linear channels,
but a linear channel may also be non-Gaussian. Since
the proofs of [16, 18] only involve estimating the sec-
ond moments of Alice and Bob’s correlations, they are
compatible with a practical implementation taking into
account finite-size effects [13], but they are not fully gen-
eral.
In the present paper, we extend the security proof of
discrete modulation protocols against arbitrary collective
attacks. Our proof still only requires us to estimate two
quantities: the transmission T and excess noise ξ of the
quantum channel, without carrying out a full channel
tomography. But achieving this estimation requires the
use of decoy states, as will be explained in Section IV.
Since the four-state protocol always outperforms the
two-state protocol, we will only discuss the case of
the former in the present paper. In this proto-
col, the modulation consists of four coherent states:
|αeipi/4〉, |αe3ipi/4〉, |αe−3ipi/4〉, |αe−ipi/4〉 where α is a pos-
itive number. The modulation variance VA is given by
VA = 2α
2.
The practical implementation of the reverse reconcili-
ation problem for the four-state protocol is discussed in
details in Appendix B.
B. Heterodyne detection: non-Gaussian continuous
modulations
Before introducing the modulation schemes compatible
with a heterodyne detection, let us say a few words con-
cerning the reconciliation procedure. The main difficulty
here lies in the fact that we need a reverse reconcilia-
tion. Indeed, the side information sent by Bob must help
Alice without giving Eve any relevant information. The
only schemes where side information seems to have these
properties (while being efficiently computable by Bob)
are when it describes rotations in particular dimensions,
namely dimensions 1, 2, 4 and 8 [10]. This surprising
result is a consequence of the fact that the only real di-
vision algebras are the real numbers (R), the complex
numbers (C ∼= R2), the quaternions (H ∼= R4) and the
octonions (O ∼= R8). Indeed, one can show that the pos-
sibility of an efficient reconciliation protocol (in terms
of computation complexity as well as classical commu-
nication) is intimately connected with the existence of a
division operation for the data considered. In particu-
lar, identifying vectors in R, R2, R4 or R8 with units of
the real numbers, the complex numbers, the quaternions
or the octonions allows one to take benefit of the divi-
sion structure naturally associated with these ensembles.
For instance, the reconciliation protocol of the four-state
protocol exploits this property in dimension 1. The mod-
ulation schemes we consider now exploit it for dimensions
2, 4 and 8.
First, note that in the case of the four-state protocol,
Alice chooses the value of each quadrature uniformly on
the (0-dimensional) sphere S0 = {−1, 1} in dimension
1. (This value is then appropriately rescaled to obtain
the desired variance of modulation.) For this reason, we
will sometimes refer to the four-state protocol as the 1-
dimensional protocol in the rest of the paper.
The modulation schemes we consider now are simply
the generalizations to dimensions 2, 4 and 8. Hence,
in the d-dimensional protocol (with d ∈ {2, 4, 8}), Alice
draws random variables uniformly on the sphere Sd−1 in
dimension d.
For d = 2, Alice draws n points on the unit circle:
{(x11, x21), (x12, x22), · · · , (x1n, x2n)}, and sends the n coher-
ent states |x11 + ix21〉, · · · , |x1n + ix2n〉, where the variables
are rescaled by a factor α.
For d = 4, Alice draws n/2 points on the sphere S3:
{(x11, x21, x31, x41), · · · , (x1n/2, x2n/2, x3n/2, x4n/2)}, and sends
the n coherent states |x11 + ix21〉, |x31 + ix41〉 · · · , |x3n/2 +
ix4n/2〉, where the variables are rescaled by a factor α
√
2.
For d = 8, Alice draws n/4 points on the sphere S7:
{(x11, x21, x31, x41, x51, x61, x71, x81), · · · , (x1n/4, x2n/4, x3n/4, x4n/4,
x5n/4, x
6
n/4, x
7
n/4, x
8
n/4)}, and sends the n coherent states
|x11 + ix21〉, |x31 + ix41〉 · · · , |x7n/4 + ix8n/4〉, where the
variables are rescaled by a factor 2α.
The procedure to reduce the reverse reconciliation
problem in these three scenarios to the usual problem
of channel coding for the BI-AWGN channel is explained
4in detail in Appendix B.
Let us say a few words about what we mean by efficient
reconciliation procedure in the context of QKD. Usually
in the field of computer science, an algorithm is said to
be efficient if the amount of resources (e.g. running time,
randomness generation, classical communication, etc) it
consumes grow at most polynomially with the natural
size of the problem. In the case of a reconciliation pro-
cedure, the problem size is given by the length n of the
vectors Alice and Bob try to agree on. As n usually takes
very large values (for instance 1010 or 1012), an algorithm
requiring resources scaling as n2 or n3 is obviously un-
acceptable: only a linear scaling is compatible with a
practical implementation. Moreover, the factor of pro-
portionality should be small enough. For d = 1, 2, 4 or 8,
the reconciliation procedure introduced in [10] requires
that Bob draws one random bit and transmits classically
one real number to Alice per exchanged signal. The com-
putational complexity of the protocol (not including the
decoding of the error correcting code) is linear with n.
For values of d strictly greater than 8, the naive approach
(which consists in drawing random transformations uni-
formly in the orthogonal groupOd and transmitting them
to Alice) requires that Bob draw d random variables from
a normal distribution (instead of only 1 bit) and to send
d real values to Alice for each exchanged quantum signal,
which is prohibitive for a realistic implementation.
It should be emphasized that the higher the dimension,
the higher the secret key rate of the QKD protocol. The
reason for this is the very specific technique that we use
to bound Eve’s information. Our bound depends only on
the covariance matrix of Alice and Bob’s bipartite state
in the entanglement-based version of the protocol, and
therefore is tight only when the state is Gaussian. Fortu-
nately, if the state is almost Gaussian, then the bound is
good enough for our purpose. Because of this, we want to
use a protocol as Gaussian as possible. It turns out that
considering modulations in higher and higher dimensions
brings us closer and closer to the Gaussian modulation
for which the bound is tight. Indeed, a Gaussian modu-
lation of variance 1 can be seen as drawing uniformly a
random point of the sphere of radius
√
d in Rd as d tends
to infinity. Hence, the GG02 protocol with a Gaussian
modulation can be seen as the d-dimensional protocol
with d = ∞. Unfortunately, for d = ∞, efficient recon-
ciliation techniques at low SNR are not known.
IV. DECOY STATES
As we already mentioned, it is crucial that the security
proof of CV QKD protocols requires the estimation of
only a few parameters. Ideally, one would like a GG02-
type security proof where only the transmission T and
the excess noise ξ of the quantum channel need to be
estimated.
As we will discuss in Section V, the security proof of
our protocols indeed relies on the fact that one can esti-
mate the covariance matrix of Alice and Bob’s bipartite
state in the entanglement-based version of the protocol.
A difficulty lies in the fact that Alice and Bob do not
perform the entanglement-based version of the protocol
(in which case the covariance matrix is directly accessi-
ble in the experiment) but use instead the prepare and
measure version. Hence, if Alice encodes the variable x
in the quadrature of a state and Bob obtains the result y
when measuring this quadrature, they can estimate the
three following moments of order 2: Alice’s variance 〈x2〉,
Bob’s variance 〈y2〉 and the covariance 〈xy〉. Whereas Al-
ice and Bob’s variance in the prepare and measure sce-
nario are directly related to the respective variances in
the entanglement-based scenario, the same is not true for
the covariances.
There are two cases where the covariance matrix in the
prepare and measure protocol allows one to recover the
covariance matrix of the state in the entanglement-based
scenario, namely when the quantum channel is linear (see
Appendix A), for instance a Gaussian channel, and when
the modulation is Gaussian.
In Refs. [18, 19], the security of the protocols con-
sidered in the present paper was established in the case
of linear channels. Here, we wish to get rid of this hy-
pothesis (which can never be perfectly verified in practice
with a finite number of samples), and for this reason, it
is necessary to use a Gaussian modulation for the pa-
rameter estimation procedure. Unfortunately, it is not a
priori possible to use two different modulations for key
distribution and parameter estimation, because an eaves-
dropper could use a different strategy in each case. The
solution is to add a third modulation consisting of decoy
states. Let us call “key”, “decoy” and “G” the modu-
lations corresponding respectively to states used for the
key distillation, decoy states and states used for param-
eter estimation purposes (a Gaussian, in fact thermal,
distribution). One can define the three following states:
σdkey =
∫
pkey(α) |α〉〈α| dα (1)
σddecoy =
∫
pdecoy(α) |α〉〈α| dα (2)
σdG =
∫
pG(α) |α〉〈α| dα (3)
where α ∈ Rd for the d-dimensional protocol. (In par-
ticular, |α〉 refers here to d/2 coherent states.) In these
expressions, the probability distribution pkey is the uni-
form measure of the sphere Sd−1 (with radius α√d/2)
and pG is the Gaussian distribution N (0, α2/2)⊗d in d di-
mensions. In other words, pkey corresponds to the mod-
ulation schemes described in Section III, and pG is the
Gaussian distribution of the GG02 protocol.
If the probability distribution pdecoy is chosen such that
p σdkey + (1 − p)σddecoy = σdG, (4)
where p is a weight between 0 and 1, then the state sent
by Alice to use for parameter estimation is indistinguish-
5able from that used to distill a key (or as a decoy). The
idea is that after the exchange of quantum states is com-
plete, Alice can announce to Bob which states he can
use for the key, which states he can discard (decoys) and
which states should be used for parameter estimation.
If in principle, the form of σddecoy does not matter (it
could be any state, not necessarily of the form 2), this is
no longer true if we require the protocol to be practical.
Indeed, for this reason, we impose the extra constraint
that σddecoy should be obtained as a mixture of coherent
states, i.e. be of the form 2. We discuss this in details in
Appendix C where we describe two techniques for finding
the appropriate decoy states.
To summarize, the modulation that is used in the pro-
tocols is a mixture of three particular modulations. Let
us note pest the fraction of states that Alice and Bob want
to use for parameter estimation purposes (this fraction
can be optimized numerically but in a typical scenario,
its value can be around 50 %). Then for each state she
sends, Alice will choose either the modulation pkey(α)
with probability p(1 − pest) or modulation pG(α) with
probability pest or send a decoy state with probability
(1− p)(1 − pest).
V. SECURITY AGAINST COLLECTIVE
ATTACKS
In this paper, we restrict ourselves to the case of col-
lective attacks since they are optimal in the asymptotic
limit [7]. The (asymptotic) secret key rate K is then
given by [20]:
K = βI(A;B)− χ(B;E), (5)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, I(A;B) is the clas-
sical mutual information between Alice and Bob’s data
(for the data corresponding to the modulation pkey(α))
and χ(B;E) is the Holevo quantity:
χ(B;E) = S(ρE)−
∑
y
p(y)S(ρE|y), (6)
where S is the von Neumann entropy, y is Bob’s mea-
surement result obtained with probability p(y), ρE|y
is the corresponding state of Eve’s ancilla and ρE =∑
y p(y)ρE|y is Eve’s partial state.
Note that this rate should be modified to take finite-
size effects into account. For simplicity, we only con-
sider the asymptotic rate here, but a complete analysis
of finite-size effects can be found in Ref. [13].
Since the quantity βI(A;B) is directly observable in
practice, the goal of the security proof consists in deriving
an upper bound for the quantity χ(B;E) which should
be a function of parameters accessible in an experiment.
In our case, we will find a bound which only depends on
three parameters: the variance of modulation VA which
is chosen by Alice, the transmission T and the excess
noise ξ of the quantum channel which can be estimated
with the technique described in Ref. [13].
We now consider the entanglement-based version of our
protocols. In this scenario, Alice prepares n two-mode
squeezed vacuum states, keeps one half of each state and
sends the second half to Bob through the quantum chan-
nel.
Let us introduce some notations. In the following, we
will consider bipartite states, either before or after the
quantum channel. We use the superscript 0 to denote
states before the quantum channel. Moreover, the action
of the quantum channel can be described by a map 1 ⊗
T where the identity acts on the first part of the state
(namely, Alice’s state) and the quantum channel T acts
non-trivially only on the second part of the state.
The three states of interest are ρ0G, ρ
0
key and ρ
0
decoy,
which are the Schmidt purifications of the states σdG, σ
d
key
and σddecoy, respectively. (Note for instance that ρ
0
G is a
two-mode squeezed vacuum: ρ0G = |EPR〉〈EPR|.) After
the quantum channel, these three states become respec-
tively ρG, ρkey and ρdecoy.
The main idea of the security proof is that one can
bound Eve’s information by a function of the covariance
matrix of the state used to distill the key: ρkey. In the
protocol, Alice always starts with a two-mode squeezed
state ρ0G but she can choose between two measurement
strategies depending on whether a given state will be
used for key distillation or for parameter estimation.
We also introduce a general measurement acting on
Alice’s part {Πd,1−Πd} such that, when applied to the
two-mode squeezed vacuum ρ0G, the result corresponding
to Πd prepares the state ρ
0
key used in the d-dimensional
protocol while the second result prepares ρ0decoy (see Ap-
pendix D for a description of this measurement).
For each state, Alice chooses randomly between key
distillation and parameter estimation. The fraction of
each task should be optimized taking into account all
finite-size effects.
If a state is dedicated to parameter estimation, Alice
simply performs a heterodyne detection on her part and
Bob proceeds as usual. At the end of the protocol, Alice
and Bob can compare their statistics and compute the
covariance matrix ΓG of the state ρG. For this, we do not
need to make any assumption (for instance of linearity)
concerning the quantum channel.
If a state is to be used for key distillation, then Alice
performs the generalized measurement {Πd,1 − Πd} on
her half of the state, thus preparing ρ0key with probability
p and ρ0decoy with probability 1−p. States corresponding
to the result 1−Πd will later be discarded. Finally, only
the states ρ0key are used for key distillation. Let us note
Γ0key (Γkey) the covariance matrix of these states before
(after) the quantum channel.
It was proven in [4] that the quantity χ(B;E) can al-
ways be upper bounded by a function of the covariance
matrix of Alice and Bob’s bipartite state. Here, the state
used for key distillation is ρkey, meaning that one can
6bound χ(B;E) with a (known) function of Γkey (see Ref.
[8] for the precise form of this function).
All that is left to do is therefore to compute the covari-
ance matrix Γkey. Note that the covariance matrix Γ
0
key
of the state before the quantum channel can be computed
and only depends on the modulation variance (as well as
the dimension of the modulation scheme). Details on how
to compute this covariance matrix are given in Appendix
E.
The covariance matrix Γ0key has the following form
(with the convention xA, pA, xB, pB):
Γ0key=
(
(VA + 1)12 Zd σz
Zd σz (VA + 1)12
)
(7)
where σz = diag(1,−1). Here VA = 2α2 is Alice’s mod-
ulation variance in the prepare and measure version of
the protocol and Zd is a function of VA and the di-
mension d of the protocol. The two-mode squeezed vac-
uum, corresponding to a modulation on a sphere whose
dimension tends to infinity, has the same form with
Z∞ := ZEPR =
√
V 2A + 2VA. A comparison of Z1 (four-
state protocol), Z8 with the maximal value ZEPR is dis-
played on Figure 1.
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Figure 1: (Color online) Comparison of the covariance coeffi-
cient Z for the states ρ0EPR (top solid black curve) and ρ
0
key
for the four-state protocol (bottom short-dashed blue curve)
and the 8-dimensional protocol (middle long-dash red curve)
as a function of the variance of modulation VA.
One also knows the covariance matrix ΓG of the state
ρG after the quantum channel:
ΓG=
(
(VA + 1)12
√
T ZEPR σz√
T ZEPR σz (1 + TVA + Tξ)12
)
(8)
where T and ξ refer respectively to the transmission and
excess noise of the channel and can be estimated experi-
mentally [21].
The last part of the argument consists in proving that
the covariance matrix Γkey has the same form (or at least
can be safely considered to have the same form) as ΓG
after the quantum channel, if one simply replaces ZEPR
by Zd:
Γkey=
(
(VA + 1)12
√
T Zd σz√
T Zd σz (1 + TVA + Tξ)12
)
(9)
This is clear if the quantum channel T is linear, for
instance Gaussian but the argument is more involved in
the case of an arbitrary quantum channel.
In fact, if the channel is linear, Alice and Bob can
directly compute the covariance matrix Γkey from the
data corresponding to the modulation pkey(α) and the
Gaussian modulation or the decoy states are not required
in that case [18, 19].
Because the modulation considered here is indistin-
guishable from a Gaussian modulation, the parameter
estimation is performed in such a way that there are no
privileged direction in phase space. However, this is for-
mally not enough to warrant that Eve’s attack has the
same symmetry. We therefore provide the following two
strategies: either one assumes that the symmetry is not
broken by Eve (which in theory could be checked by per-
forming a tomography of the state), or one does not want
to make such an assumption and prefers to actively sym-
metrize the protocol.
In the first scenario, under the assumption that the
symmetry of the quantum channel is not broken, the se-
curity protocol with decoy states presented here is at least
as good as in the case where the channel is linear. Indeed
the quantum state shared by Alice and Bob is invariant
under the group of conjugate passive symplectic oper-
ations applied on Alice’s n modes and Bob’s n modes,
which means that their state can be safely considered
to be Gaussian if the analysis is restricted to collective
attacks [6].
However, if one does not want to rely of the assumption
that the symmetry is not broken, it is possible to remove
this assumption thanks to an active symmetrization of
the protocol. This is described in detail in Appendixes F
and G. This additional step shows that the state ρG after
the quantum channel is rotationally invariant in phase
space. Therefore, when restricting ourselves to collective
attacks, we conclude using the technique presented in
Ref. [6] that the state ρG can be safely considered to
be Gaussian. In particular, the covariance matrix given
in Eq. 9 can be used for the security analysis, with the
same values of T and ξ as the ones in ΓG, obtained from
the parameter estimation step.
Finally, using the covariance matrix Γkey, one can com-
pute the quantity χ(B;E) using for instance the formal-
ism detailed in [8].
VI. PERFORMANCE OF THE PROTOCOLS
The (asymptotic) secret key rate of the protocols reads:
K = βI(A;B) − χ(B;E). (10)
The idea in our protocols is to use a modulation scheme
which is compatible with a very efficient reconciliation,
7thereby greatly increasing the quantity βI(A;B) in com-
parison with Gaussian modulation protocols.
The price to pay is that this non Gaussianity makes
our bound on χ(B;E) less tight. This is because the cor-
relation Zd of the state ρ
0
key is strictly less than ZEPR
for a given variance of modulation. Interestingly, this
discrepancy can be interpreted in terms of excess noise:
the fact that ρ0key displays smaller correlations than the
two-mode squeezed state has the same effect as some vir-
tual excess noise. In particular, the value of χ(B;E)
one obtains in the d-dimensional protocol corresponds
to the value one would obtain for a Gaussian modula-
tion protocol (GG02) with a quantum channel charac-
terized by a transmission TG = T/F ≈ T , and an excess
noise ξG = Fξ + (F − 1)VA ≈ ξ + (F − 1)VA, where
F ≡ (ZEPR/Zd)2. Since one has F ≈ 1 for reason-
able values of VA (see Figure 1), the main effect of the
non-Gaussian modulation is the equivalent excess noise
∆ξ = (F −1)VA. Figure 2 displays this equivalent excess
noise in the case of the four-state protocol (d = 1) and
the 8-dimensional protocol.
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Figure 2: (Color online) Equivalent excess noise ∆ξ due to
the non-Gaussian modulation as a function of the variance
of modulation VA. Upper curve refers to the four-state pro-
tocol, lower curve to the 8-dimensional protocol. By defini-
tion, a protocol with a Gaussian modulation does not display
any equivalent excess noise. An excess noise of one unit of
shot noise corresponds to an entanglement-breaking channel,
therefore no security is possible with such a level of noise. This
figure clearly shows that the 8-dimensional protocol outper-
forms significantly the four-state protocol.
In state-of-the-art implementations [8, 9], the excess
noise is typically less than a few percent of the shot noise.
This gives an approximate limit for the value of the equiv-
alent excess noise that is acceptable. In particular, for
the four-state protocol, one needs to work with modu-
lation variances below 0.5 units of shot noise. On the
contrary, it becomes possible to work with much higher
variances in the case of 8-dimensional protocol.
In Fig. 3, we display the asymptotic secret key rate of
the four-state and the 8-dimensional protocols. The vari-
ous parameters are chosen conservatively: a quantum ef-
ficiency of 60%, a reconciliation efficiency of 80% and an
excess noise of 0.005 or 0.01 units of shot noise. The su-
periority of the 8-dimensional protocol is quite clear: the
secret key rate is higher by nearly an order of magnitude,
and one can work with significantly larger modulation
variances (the optimized variances are VA = 0.3 for the
four-state protocol and VA = 0.7 for the 8-dimensional
protocol).
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Figure 3: (Color online) Asymptotic secret key rate K for
the 8-dimensional protocol (solid lines) and the four-state
protocol (dashed lines) as a function of the distance (assum-
ing transmission through a standard telecommunications fiber
with 0.2 dB of loss per kilometer). The various parameters
are an excess noise of 0.005 (upper red lines) or 0.01 (lower
blue lines) and a quantum efficiency of the detectors η of 60%.
Reconciliation efficiency is supposed to be a conservative 80%.
To confirm the robustness of the 8-dimensional pro-
tocol, we display in Fig. 4 the secret key rate when
finite-size effects are taken into account. The secret key
rate is computed against collective attacks, as detailed in
Ref. [13]. Among various finite-size effects [22], the most
crucial ones for continuous-variable protocols are clearly
the imperfect reconciliation efficiency (which prevents the
protocol with a Gaussian modulation to achieve key dis-
tribution over large distances) and the parameter estima-
tion. While the reconciliation efficiency is taken care of
by the 8-dimensional continuous modulation, the param-
eter estimation is quite sensitive for continuous-variable
protocols. In fact, the real problem lies in the estimation
of the excess noise ξ, which is very small compared to the
shot noise, and thus hard to evaluate accurately.
In Fig. 4, all such finite-size effects are taken into ac-
count [13]. The results are rather pessimistic, but remem-
ber that this is also true for all discrete-variable protocols
[23], and the protocols presented here perform reasonably
well in comparison. While exchanging 1014 quantum sig-
nals is rather unrealistic, exchanging 1010 or even 1011
signals is not completely out of reach of today’s technol-
ogy. Hence, our protocols allow the distribution of secret
keys over distances of the order of 100 km, taking into
account all finite-size effects.
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Figure 4: (Color online) Non-asymptotic secret key rate K for
the 8-dimensional protocol, obtained for realistic values: ex-
cess noise ξ = 0.005, security parameter ǫ ≈ 10−10, quantum
efficiency of the detectors η = 60%, reconciliation efficiency
80% for the BI-AWGN channel and transmission through a
telecommunications fiber with 0.2 dB of loss per kilometer.
Half the samples are used for parameter estimation. From
left to right, the block length is equal to 108, 1010, 1012 and
1014.
VII. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In conclusion, we introduced continuous-variable QKD
protocols with non-Gaussian modulations. We estab-
lished the security of these protocols against arbitrary
collective attacks, which implies their unconditional se-
curity in the asymptotic limit.
The four-state (the 8-dimensional) protocol appears
optimal from a practical point of view among all pro-
tocols using a homodyne (heterodyne) detection in the
sense that it allows an efficient reconciliation while re-
maining as close as possible to the theoretically optimal
Gaussian protocols [3, 14].
The main open questions concern the status of the
decoy states. First, it should be possible to prove the
security of the protocols considered here without requir-
ing any decoy states. This might come at the price of
slightly degraded bounds (to take into account possi-
ble non Gaussian attacks). Second, without removing
the decoy states, an important question is how well they
should approximate the Gaussian distribution. Put oth-
erwise, how indistinguishable should the distribution cor-
responding to key distillation be from the one used for
parameter estimation? In particular, how should this
distinguishability be taken into account in the overall se-
curity parameter of the protocol?
Finally, the most outstanding problem that remains
for continuous-variable QKD protocol concerns general
attacks. This question was partially answered with the
derivation of a de Finetti-type theorem for quantum sys-
tems of infinite dimension [7]. However, the bounds ob-
tained there are not good enough to be used in prac-
tice. Hence, it seems crucial to see if the post-selection
technique introduced in [24] can be adapted to contin-
uous variables, since this technique is already known to
provide much better (almost tight) bounds than the de
Finetti theorem in the case of discrete variables [25].
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Appendix A: Linear quantum channels
We shall define a linear quantum channel by the input-
output relations of the quadrature operators in Heisen-
berg representation :
Xout = gXXin + BX
Pout = gPPin +BP (A1)
where the added noisesBX , BP are uncorrelated with the
input quadratures Xin, Pin. Such relations have been
extensively used for instance in the context of Quan-
tum Non-Demolition (QND) measurements of continu-
ous variables [26], and they are closely related to the
linearized approximation commonly used in quantum
optics. Gaussian channels (channels that preserve the
Gaussianity of the states) are usual examples of linear
quantum channels. However, linear quantum channels
may also be non-Gaussian, this will be the case for in-
stance if the added noises BX , BP are non-Gaussian.
For our purpose, the main advantage of a linear quan-
tum channel is that it will be characterized by transmis-
sion coefficients TX = g
2
X , TP = g
2
P , and by the vari-
ances of the added noises BX and BP . These quantities
can be determined even if the modulation used by Al-
ice is non-Gaussian, with the same measured values as
when the modulation is Gaussian (because these values
are intrinsic properties of the channel). The relevant co-
variance matrix can then be easily determined, and Eve’s
information can be bounded by using the Gaussian op-
timality theorem. This justifies the approach taken in
refs. [16, 18], but unfortunately this is not fully general,
contrary to the proof of the present paper.
Appendix B: Efficient reverse reconciliation
The goal of this section is to explain how an efficient
reconciliation can be achieved for the various modula-
tion schemes considered in this article, for arbitrarily low
SNR.
Reconciliation in a QKD protocol is very similar to the
problem of channel coding (that is, transmitting infor-
mation efficiently and reliably on a noisy communication
channel) with the additional constraint that the input of
the channel is not chosen by Alice but instead randomly
picked from a given probability distribution correspond-
ing to the modulation scheme. In particular, the usual
task is the following: Alice and Bob are given two n-
dimensional real vectors x and y and their goal is to agree
on a common bit string u. A supplementary constraint
when dealing with reverse reconciliation is that u should
be a function (possibly randomized) of y, and that all
public communication should be from Bob to Alice.
There exists a standard technique for reducing the
problem of reconciliation to the one of channel coding,
namely coset coding introduced by Wyner [27]. The idea
is that Bob will use an additional public (but authenti-
cated) channel to describe a function f such f(y) = u.
Alice can then apply this function to her vector and ob-
tain v := f(x). In the case of coset coding, the descrip-
tion of f is simply a translation corresponding to the
syndrome of y for a linear error correcting code C. This
gives rise to a virtual communication channel with input
u and output v for which one can apply standard channel
coding techniques.
One case where reconciliation can be performed very
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efficiently occurs when the virtual channel is a binary-
input additive white Gaussian noise (BI-AWGN) chan-
nel meaning that the coordinates of u and v are related
through
vi = ui + wi, (B1)
where ui ∈ {−1, 1} and wi is a centered normal random
variable.
For experimental realizations of continuous-variable
QKD, the quantum channel always behaves in very
good approximation like a Gaussian channel and the BI-
AWGN channel is therefore the model of interest here. In
this case, it is possible to show that the existence of an
efficiently computable function f is possible only for very
specific modulation schemes, namely the cases where d-
uplets of xi are distributed uniformly on the unit sphere
in dimension 1, 2, 4 or 8 [10]. The case d = 1 corre-
sponds to a binary modulation, that is, the four-state
protocol (which indeed displays a binary modulation for
each quadrature) ; the case d = 8 corresponds to the
8-dimensional modulation.
Let us therefore consider d-uplets xd and yd, with
xd ∼ U(Sd−1) and yd = xd + zd with zd ∼ N (0, σ2)d.
Without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to
the case where the transmission is 1.
For dimensions 1, 2, 4 and 8, the unit sphere Sd−1
has a division algebra. In particular, a d-dimensional
vector can be identified with an element of Rd, that is,
a real number (d = 1), a complex number (d = 2), a
quaternion (d = 4) or an octonion (d = 8). Therefore,
both multiplication and division are well defined in this
context.
Bob chooses a random element ud ∈ {−1/√d, 1/√d}d
with the uniform distribution on the d-dimensional hy-
percube and sends the variable td := udyd to Al-
ice (through the classical channel). Alice computes
vd := td
(
xd
)−1
which is possible because Sd−1 is a di-
vision algebra. We now wish to prove that the channel
ud → vd = ud + wd is a BI-AWGN channel. Let us
characterize the noise wd on this virtual channel:
wd ≡ vd − ud (B2)
= td
(
xd
)−1 − ud (B3)
= udyd
(
xd
)−1 − ud (B4)
= ud(yd
(
x
d
)−1 − 1) (B5)
= ud((xd + zd)
(
xd
)−1 − 1) (B6)
= udzd
(
xd
)−1
. (B7)
Since ud and
(
xd
)−1
are simply rotations on Sd−1, one
concludes that wd ∼ N (0, σ2)⊗d, which proves that the
virtual channel ud → vd is indeed a BI-AWGN channel,
for which efficient error correcting codes are available.
If n = d ×m, Alice and Bob simply divide their data
into m d-uplets and proceed as described above. All is
left to do is to use coset coding to finish the reconcili-
ation: Bob sends the syndrome of un for a linear code
Alice and he agreed on beforehand. Alice simply decodes
her word vn in the coset code defined by the syndrome.
This can be done very efficiently with capacity approach-
ing codes such as low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes
[28]. If the SNR is very low, then one can work with a
concatenation of a low rate LDPC code (such as a multi-
edge LDPC code for instance [29]) with a repetition code.
This simple technique allows one to obtain good error
correcting codes of arbitrarily low rate (see Chapter 5.2
of Ref. [30] for more details concerning this concatena-
tion technique).
Appendix C: Decoys with coherent states
In the entanglement-based version of the protocol, one
has to apply the generalized measurements {Πd,1−Πd}.
In the prepare and measure scenario, it is therefore nec-
essary for Alice to send states which are compatible with
these measurements. The states corresponding to the
operator Πd are not a problem, since by construction,
they correspond to the modulation used to distill the key,
that is, coherent states drawn uniformly on the sphere in
d dimensions. The states corresponding to the opera-
tor 1−Πd might be a little bit more problematic in the
sense that they are not usually easy to produce experi-
mentally. Ideally, one would like to be able to produce
these states simply by modulating coherent states (which
are the only states simple enough to allow for a realistic
QKD protocol). In particular, if Alice applies the mea-
surements {Πd,1 − Πd}, then one obtains the following
relation:
σdG = p σ
d
key + (1− p)σddecoy, (C1)
with p = psuccd . However, in this case, the state σ
d
decoy
does not have a positive P -function, meaning that it can-
not be obtained as a mixture of coherent states.
We now present two different techniques to deal with
this problem: either one replaces σdkey with a noisy ver-
sion (see Appendix C 1) or one relaxes Equation C1 and
considers instead an approximate version of the decoy
states (see Appendix C 2).
1. Perfect decoys with noisy signal
Let us consider the prepare and measure version of
the d-dimensional protocol. In this case, the Gaussian
modulation can be seen as sending d/2 coherent states
|α1 + iα2〉, · · · , |αd−1 + iαd〉 such that the random vari-
ables αi are independent and identically distributed cen-
tered normal variables. Without loss of generality, we
consider variables with variance 1/d. Taking advan-
tage of the rotational invariance of the Gaussian distri-
bution, one can equivalently choose the random vector
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α := (α1, · · · , αd) by first picking uniformly a random
point of the unit sphere Sd−1 in d dimensions, and draw-
ing the radius r :=
√∑
α2i of the vector α from a chi
distribution with d degrees of freedom. In particular, the
probability density function of r is:
f(r, d) =
2 (d/2)
d/2
rd−1e−dr
2/2
(d/2− 1)! . (C2)
The probability distributions corresponding to d = 1, 2, 4
and 8 are displayed on Figure 5. In particular, it should
be noted that they become more and more peaked as the
dimension d increases. In this picture, the probability
distribution corresponding to the key, that is σdkey, is by
construction a Dirac distribution centered in 1.
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Figure 5: (Color online) Probability density functions for the
radius of α in the d-dimensional protocol for a Gaussian mod-
ulation. From least peaked to most peaked, d = 1, 2, 4 and
8.
The first approach we investigate aims at satisfying
Equation C1 exactly while allowing for a positive (and
non-negligible) probability p of sending a signal state.
This is done by considering slightly noisy versions of the
true signal modulation.
In particular, one chooses two parameters γmin ∈ [0, 1]
and γmax ≥ 1 and defines the states used for key distil-
lation as the ones with a radius bounded by these two
parameters: γmin ≤ r ≤ γmax. The decoy states then
simply correspond to the remaining states. Provided that
γmin and γmax are close enough to 1, the penalty imposed
by this noise, compared to the ideal case where the key
modulation is strictly equal to 1, is negligible in terms of
reconciliation efficiency.
On the other hand, one should not choose values too
close to 1, otherwise the probability p that a given state
can be used for key distillation will be very small:
p =
∫ γmax
γmin
f(r, d) dr. (C3)
Hence, optimizing the values of γmin and γmax should
be seen as a tradeoff between the penalty imposed on
reconciliation efficiency and the probability that a given
state can be used for key distillation.
Note also that with this approach, the state σdkey is not
longer described as in Appendix E. In particular, the
covariance matrix of the new state is a little bit different
from the one presented in Appendix E. We do not give
an explicit derivation of the new covariance matrix here,
but we point out that because the new state used for
the key is actually closer to a Gaussian modulation, the
Holevo information between Bob and Eve can still be
safely bounded using the covariance matrix given in Eq.
9.
We now give a second approach to the problem of ap-
proximating decoy states with coherent states.
2. Approximate decoys with noiseless signal
Our goal is still to achieve the following equality:
σdG = p σ
d
key + (1− p)σddecoy, (C4)
but this time, without considering a noisy version of
σdkey. If one chooses p = p
succ
d as defined in Appendix D,
then the state σddecoy does not have a positive P -function,
meaning that it cannot be obtained as a mixture of co-
herent states. Fortunately, P -functions can be regular-
ized rather well, and for our purpose, it is sufficient to
find a state σddecoy with a non negative P -function such
that Equation C4 only holds approximately. Here, ap-
proximately should be understood in terms of the trace
distance.
More precisely, we are interested in finding a probabil-
ity distribution (hence non negative) P (α) such that
||σdG − p σdkey − (1− p)
∫
P (α)|α〉〈α| dα||1 ≤ ǫ (C5)
for a value of ǫ sufficiently small.
If Eq. C5 holds and Alice uses the modulation P (α)
for the decoy states, then the probability that Eve can
distinguish the states used for key distillation from the
ones used for parameter estimation is upper bounded by
ǫ.
Here, we do not give a solution for the problem of
finding the best distribution P compatible with a success
probability p and the error ǫ, but we point out that the
usual optimization tools (for instance the optimization
toolbox of Matlab) allow one to find very good instances
of P . For example, for the 2-dimensional protocol and
α = 0.5, we could obtain a value of ǫ less than 10−5 for
p = 1/2 with a distribution P corresponding to a sum
of 6 Dirac distributions, that is a mixture of 6 particular
coherent states.
The natural question that arises here is how good
should the approximation be? Is a trace distance equal
to 10−5 sufficient to guarantee a reasonable level of secu-
rity? Or should one aim for a value of 10−10?
Note that if the approximation is not perfect, it means
that Eve might have a (very) small probability to distin-
guish between the states used for the key distillation and
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d Protocol Resource state
1 4-state |EPR〉
2 2-dim |EPR〉
4 4-dim |EPR〉⊗2
8 8-dim |EPR〉⊗4
Table I: Parameterization of the various protocols. Parameter
d corresponds to the number of quadratures that should be
processed together.
those used for parameter estimation. However, discrim-
inating between these two modulations does not appear
to be a good solution for Eve as this would induce a lot
of phase noise in the signal: indeed, because all the mod-
ulations considered here are phase-invariant, the optimal
discrimination procedure consists in projecting the states
onto Fock states, thereby erasing all the phase informa-
tion. For this reason, a trace distance of 10−5 between
ρdecoy and its approximation is very likely to be sufficient
for any practical implementation.
Appendix D: Measurement operator
We now describe the general measurement {Πd,1 −
Πd} performed by Alice to prepare the state ρ0key from
a two-mode squeezed vacuum. The state to which this
measurement is applied is a (possibly multimodal) two-
mode squeezed vacuum as described in Table D.
a. Four-state protocol: d = 1
The operator Π1 is defined as Π1 =M
†
1M1 with
M1 = m1
3∑
k=0
|ψk〉〈ek| (D1)
and
m1 :=
e(1+α
2)/2
2
√
⌊1 + α2⌋!
(1 + α2)⌊1+α2⌋
. (D2)
The states |ψk〉 are defined in Appendix E and
|ek〉 = e−β2/2
∞∑
n=0
β∗nk√
n!
|n〉 (D3)
with β =
√
1 + α2 and Arg(βk) = Arg(αk).
When performing the general measurement {Π1,1 −
Π1}, conditioned on the result corresponding to Π1, the
state ρ is transformed into ρ′:
ρ −→ ρ′ := M1ρM
†
1
trM1ρM
†
1
. (D4)
Let us consider the state ρ0G := |EPR〉〈EPR| with
|EPR〉 =
∞∑
n=0
√
α2n
(1 + α2)n+1
|n〉|n〉. (D5)
Conditioned on the result Π1, one obtains
M1ρGM
†
1 =
4m21e
−(α2+1)
α2 + 1
|Ψ1〉〈Ψ1| (D6)
with
|Ψ1〉 = 1
2
3∑
k
|ψk〉|αk〉. (D7)
The condition Π ≤ 1 leads to m1 ≤ mmax1 with
mmax1 :=
e(1+α
2)/2
2
√
⌊1 + α2⌋!
(1 + α2)⌊1+α2⌋
. (D8)
The probability of obtaining the result corresponding
to Π1, meaning successfully creating a state |Ψ1〉 is
psucc1 = trM1ρM
†
1 =
⌊1 + α2⌋!
(1 + α2)⌊2+α2⌋
(D9)
and is displayed on Figure 6 as a function of α.
b. Continuous modulations: d = 2, 4, 8
For d = 2, 4, 8, one has:
|Ψd〉 =
∞∑
k=0
√
fn(k)|ψdk〉 (D10)
where
fn(k) = e
−nα2 n
kα2k
k!
(D11)
and
|ψ2k〉 := |k〉|k〉
|ψ4k〉 :=
1√
k + 1
k∑
k1=0
|k1, k − k1〉|k1, k − k1〉
|ψ8k〉 :=
1√(
k+3
3
) ∑
∑
i
ki=k
|k1, k2, k3, k4〉|k1, k2, k3, k4〉
One also has:
|EPR〉 =
∞∑
k=0
√
g2(k)|ψ2k〉
|EPR〉⊗2 =
∞∑
k=0
√
g4(k)|ψ4k〉
|EPR〉⊗4 =
∞∑
k=0
√
g8(k)|ψ8k〉
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with
gn(k) =
(
n+ k − 1
k
)
α2k
(1 + α2)n+k
. (D12)
gn is a negative binomial distribution NB
(
d, α
2
1+α2
)
. Let
us define the operators Π2,Π4 and Π8 as
Πd = πd
∞∑
k=0
fd(k)
gd(k)
trB|ψdk〉〈ψdk| (D13)
where πd is given by:
πd(α) = min
k∈N
g(k)
f(k)
(D14)
ensuring that Πd is a genuine POVM element. It is
straightforward to check that the probability of success
of the measurement is
psuccd =
g(⌈α2d⌉)
f(⌈α2d⌉) . (D15)
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
0.2
0.4
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Figure 6: (Color online) Probability of success of the measure-
ment Πd as a function of α. From bottom to top, d = 1, 2, 4
and 8.
Appendix E: Covariance matrices
In this appendix, we derive the covariance matrices
of the states corresponding to the four-state protocol,
which is optimal with a homodyne detection, and the 8-
dimensional protocol which is optimal for a heterodyne
detection. The covariance matrices corresponding to the
other (suboptimal) choices of modulation can be found
with a similar technique.
Let us note |Ψd〉 for d ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8} the state used for
the key distillation in each protocol, i.e. ρ0key = |Ψd〉〈Ψd|
and |Ψ1〉 is the initial bipartite state for the four-state
protocol whereas |Ψ8〉 corresponds to the 8-dimensional
protocol. The two-mode squeezed vacuum is noted as
|EPR〉.
1. Four-state protocol: d = 1
Let us use the notation |αk〉 := |αe(2k+1)ipi/4〉 for k ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3} and α > 0.
In the four-state protocol, the state ρ0key is a pure state
|Ψ1〉 defined as
|Ψ1〉 =
3∑
k=0
√
λk|φk〉|φk〉 (E1)
=
1
2
3∑
k=0
|ψk〉|αk〉 (E2)
where
|φk〉 = e
−α2/2
√
λk
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n α
4n+k√
(4n+ k)!
|4n+ k〉 (E3)
|ψk〉 = 1
2
3∑
m=0
ei(1+2k)mpi/4|φm〉 (E4)
for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and{
λ0,2 =
1
2e
−α2
(
cosh(α2)± cos(α2))
λ1,3 =
1
2e
−α2
(
sinh(α2)± sin(α2)) (E5)
Let us note a and b the annihilation operators on the
two modes. Applying a to |φk〉 gives:
a|φk〉 = α
√
λk−1√
λk
|φk−1〉 (E6)
for k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
a|φ0〉 = −α
√
λ3√
λ0
|φ3〉. (E7)
Let us compute the covariance matrix Γ1 of the bipar-
tite state |Ψ1〉. It has the following form:
Γ1 =
(
X12 Z1 σz
Z1 σz Y 12
)
(E8)
One has:
X = Y = 〈Ψ1|1 + 2a†a|Ψ1〉 = 〈Ψ1|1 + 2b†b|Ψ1〉(E9)
= tr(1 + 2
3∑
k=0
a†a λk|φk〉〈φk|) (E10)
= 1 + 2
3∑
k=0
λk〈φk|a†a|φk〉 (E11)
= 1 + 2α2
3∑
k=0
λk
λk−1
λk
(E12)
= 1 + 2α2. (E13)
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The correlation term Z1 of the covariance matrix is
given by
Z1 = 〈Ψ1|ab+ a†b†|Ψ1〉 (E14)
= 2Re〈Ψ1|ab|Ψ1〉. (E15)
One has:
ab|Ψ1〉 = ab
3∑
k=0
√
λk|φk〉|φk〉 (E16)
= α2
3∑
k=0
λk−1
λk
√
λk|φk−1〉|φk−1〉 (E17)
where addition should be understood modulo 4. Finally,
we obtain:
Z1 = 2α
2
3∑
k=0
λ
3/2
k−1
λ
1/2
k
. (E18)
It may be noticed that at the lowest order in α, the
states |φk〉 are simply the number states |k〉 for k = 0,
1, 2, 3, which are independent of α. The states |ψk〉 are
four orthogonal linear combinations of these four number
states, with coefficients of the form eippi/4, where p is an
integer.
In addition, the state |Ψ1〉 is simply (1 − α2/2)|00〉+
α2|11〉, which is also the lowest-order (Gaussian) EPR
state. Correspondingly, Z1 = ZEPR = 2α =
√
2VA, in
the limit where α tends to 0.
Since the entangled state is already Gaussian in this
regime, no decoy states are needed, and Ref. [16] can be
used directly to establish the unconditional security of
the protocol. Unfortunately, this approach is restricted
to values of α which are too small to be useful in prac-
tice; this is why the more powerful proof presented in the
present paper is needed.
2. Eight-dimensional protocol: d = 8
The partial trace σ8key = trA (|Ψ8〉〈Ψ8|) is defined by
the modulation scheme: it is the uniform mixture of
quadrimodal coherent states over a real 7-dimensional
sphere:
trA (|Ψ8〉〈Ψ8|) :=
∫
Sα
|α1, α2, α3, α4〉〈α1, α2, α3, α4|dS
(E19)
where |α1, α2, α3, α4〉 := |α1〉|α2〉|α3〉|α4〉 and the sphere
Sα is defined as
Sα ≡ {(α1, α2, α3, α4) ∈ C4
s.t.|α4k|2 + |α4k+1|2 + |α4k+2|2 + |α4k+3|2 = 4α2},
(E20)
and dS is the Haar measure on Sα. Because this state is a
four-mode orthogonally invariant state (by construction),
it can be written as [31]:
trA (|Ψ8〉〈Ψ8|) =
∞∑
k=0
λk σ
4
k, (E21)
where
σ4k =
1(
k+3
3
) ∑
k1···k4
s.t.
∑
i
ki=k
|k1, k2, k3, k4〉〈k1, k2, k3, k4|.
(E22)
In order to determine the {λk}k=0,··· ,∞, we compute the
probability Pr(k) of finding k photons in the four-mode
state trA (|Ψ8〉〈Ψ8|):
Pr(k) = tr(trA (|Ψ8〉〈Ψ8|)σ4k) (E23)
= 〈2α|〈0|〈0|〈0|σ4k |2α〉|0〉|0〉|0〉, (E24)
since |2α〉|0〉|0〉|0〉 ∈ S4. Because the coherent state |0〉,
which refers to the vacuum, does not contain any photon,
one has:
Pr(k) = 〈2α|σ4k|2α〉 (E25)
= e−4α
2 (2α)2k
k!
(E26)
= λk. (E27)
We therefore get the expression:
trA (|Ψ8〉〈Ψ8|) = e−4α2
∞∑
k=0
(2α)2k
k!
σ4k. (E28)
Finally |Ψ8〉 is defined as:
|Ψ8〉 := e−2α2
∞∑
k=0
(2α)k√
k!
|ψ4k〉, (E29)
where
|ψ4k〉 =
1√(
k+3
3
) ∑
k1···k4
s.t.
∑
i
ki=k
|k1, k2, k3, k4〉|k1, k2, k3, k4〉.
(E30)
Let us compute the covariance matrix Γ8 of |Ψ8〉. It
has the form
Γ8 =
4⊕
i=1
(
X12 Z8σz
Z8σz X12
)
. (E31)
where
X = 〈Ψ8|1 + 2a†1a1|Ψ8〉 = 〈Ψ8|1 + 2b†1b1|Ψ8〉(E32)
Z8 = 〈Ψ8|a1b1 + a†1b†1|Ψ8〉 (E33)
where a1 and b1 refer to Alice and Bob’s annihilation
operators relative to the first mode.
Tracing |ψ4k〉 over the last three modes gives ρ1k:
ρ1k =
1(
k+3
3
) k∑
l=0
(
k − l+ 2
2
)
|l, l〉〈l, l|. (E34)
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One immediately has:
〈Ψ8|a†1a1|Ψ8〉 =
1(
k+3
3
) k∑
l=0
l
(
k − l + 2
2
)
=
k
4
. (E35)
Then,
tr(a†1a1ρ
4) =
∞∑
k=0
e−4α
2 (2α)2k
k!
k
4
(E36)
= α2, (E37)
which gives X = 1 + 2α2.
Let us now compute Z8 = 〈Ψ8|a1b1+a†1b†1|Ψ8〉. First, one
notes that 〈φ4l |a1b1|ψ4k〉 = 0 except if l = k − 1. Some
combinatorics shows that
〈φ4k−1|a1b1|ψ4k〉 =
1√(
k+3
3
)(
k+2
3
)
k∑
l=0
l
(
k − l + 2
2
)
(E38)
=
1
4
√
k(k + 3). (E39)
Using the expression of |Ψ8〉, one obtains
〈Ψ8|a1b1|Ψ8〉 = 1
4
e−4α
2
∞∑
k=0
√
k + 4
k!
(2α)2k+1, (E40)
and finally
Z8 =
1
2
e−4α
2
∞∑
k=0
√
k + 4
k!
(2α)2k+1. (E41)
Appendix F: Symmetrization of the protocol
A quantum key distribution protocol is described as a
map E [24]:
E : ρAB 7−→ (SA,SB, C) (F1)
where ρAB ∈ (HA⊗HB)⊗n is the n-mode bipartite state
shared by Alice and Bob at the end of the distribution
phase (in the entanglement-based protocol), SA and SB
are respectively Alice and Bob’s final keys and C is a
transcript of all classical communication as well as Alice’s
and Bob’s raw data.
A protocol E is said to be invariant under some set of
transformations G if for any element g ∈ G, there exists
a CPTP map Kg such that:
E ◦ g = Kg ◦ E . (F2)
Let us consider the uniform measure µG on G. If the
protocol E is invariant under the set G, then it is sufficient
to prove the security of E for states displaying the same
symmetry. In particular, it is sufficient to consider states
of the form:
ρ¯AB =
1
µG(G)
∫
G
dµG(g) g(ρAB), (F3)
for any ρAB ∈ (HA ⊗ HB)⊗n and where g(ρAB) is the
image of the mode state ρAB by g.
If we consider here for G the group of conjugate pas-
sive symplectic operations applied on Alice’s n modes
and Bob’s n modes (in phase space, such operations are
simply conjugate orthogonal transformations), then for a
given operation g applied to the state, the map Kg is ob-
tained by applying the orthogonal transformations corre-
sponding to g on the classical data measured by Alice and
Bob. If the protocol is invariant under this whole group,
then it is sufficient to look at Gaussian states to prove
security against collective attacks [6]. In the prepare and
measure version of the protocol, this group becomes the
orthogonal group O(2n).
One simple way to ensure that a protocol is indeed
invariant under a set G of transformations is for Alice
and Bob to actively apply random transformations of G
to their states.
In particular, if Alice and Bob both apply random or-
thogonal transformations to their classical vectors in the
prepare and measure protocol, then the security analysis
can be done assuming that they share a Gaussian state
in the entangled version of the protocol.
For our security proof, the goal of the symmetrization
is to make sure that the state shared by Alice and Bob
is as isotropic as possible. Indeed, remember that we
need to estimate the covariance matrix of the state shared
by Alice and Bob after Alice’s generalized measurement
{Πd,1 − Πd}. The only problem that could potentially
happen would be that Eve guesses which states might be
used for key distillation and which ones might be used for
parameter estimation and that she manages to somehow
play with Alice and Bob’s correlations in order to fool
them into overestimating their correlations. To totally
prevent such a (quite unrealistic) scenario, it is sufficient
to symmetrize the state so that there are no privileged
directions in phase space that Eve could exploit. Hence,
in practice, the symmetrization does not require to apply
random conjugate passive symplectic operations chosen
with the uniform measure over the whole set of such op-
erations: a smaller subset should be efficient. A very con-
servative quantitative criterium to evaluate the quality of
such a set would be for instance the distance between the
partial trace of ρ¯AB once we trace out n − 1 modes and
the Gaussian state with the same first two moments.
1. Active symmetrization
To make sure that the protocol is indeed invariant un-
der specific transformations, we apply an active sym-
metrization step to the state ρAB before applying the
protocol. The transformations we consider are conju-
gate passive symplectic operations applied on Alice’s n
modes and Bob’s n modes, which therefore correspond to
orthogonal transformations applied to their classical vec-
tors in the prepare and measure protocol. For simplicity,
we restrict the discussion to this prepare and measure
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scheme in the following.
The active symmetrization requires us to choose a sub-
set F of the orthogonal group and for Alice and Bob, and
to apply the same element f ∈ F (chosen uniformly at
random) to their data before starting the postprocessing.
As we stressed above, taking for F the whole orthogonal
group is not necessary in practice. Hence, we want F
to be a subset of the orthogonal group with the follow-
ing properties: drawing a random element f from the
uniform measure on F should be doable with resources
(time and alea generation) scaling at most linearily in n,
the description of f should also be at most linear in n and
applying f (or f−1) to a random vector ofRn should also
be at most linear in n. These conditions ensure that the
protocol with the active symmetrization remains practi-
cal. Moreover, the symmetrization should work as well
as possible, meaning that F should symmetrize the state
as much as possible.
We give examples of such possible subsets F in the
next subsection.
2. Construction of practical symmetrizations
Let us describe a recursive algorithm that allows one to
draw an orthogonal transformation with the Haar mea-
sure on O(n).
If we assume that we already drew a random transfor-
mation R˜n−1 from the Haar measure on O(n − 1), then
let us note Rn−1 = 1⊕ R˜n−1 the orthogonal transforma-
tion in O(n) acting as the identity on the first element of
the canonical basis of Rn and as R˜n−1 on the last n− 1
elements of the basis.
Then, let us draw uniformly at random a unit vector un
on the sphere Sn−1 and define the following Householder
reflection Hn:
Hn = 1n − 2unuTn . (F4)
Note that drawing un can be done in linear time simply
by drawing n random normal variables and normalizing
the obtained vector. Also, applying Hn to any vector can
be done in linear time in n.
Finally, one can show that random orthogonal trans-
formation Rn = HnRn−1 follows the Haar distribution
of O(n) [32]. In particular, one has:
Rn =
1∏
k=n
H˜k (F5)
where one defines H˜k = 1n−k ⊕Hk.
Hence, drawing, describing and applying a random or-
thogonal transformation from O(n) are tasks with com-
plexity quadratic in n. We define the subset Fk of the
orthogonal group as corresponding to the set of compo-
sitions of k such Householder reflections, that is the last
k steps of the algorithm described above. For instance,
F1 corresponds to the set of Householder reflections with
respect to a hyperplane of Rn, and Fn is the orthogo-
nal group O(n). One can also define a family of mea-
sures µ1, µ2, · · · , µn on O(n) corresponding to the uni-
form measures of F1,F2, · · · ,Fn.
A complete symmetrization would imply performing
orthogonal transformations on both Alice and Bob’s data
chosen randomly with the measure µn, but for all prac-
tical purposes, it seems that µ1 already provides a high
level of symmetrization.
Appendix G: Full protocol with the symmetrization
step
We present here two different schemes, depending on
the choice of modulation which can be either fully Gaus-
sian or consists of a non-Gaussian modulation supple-
mented by appropriate decoy states. The former modu-
lation is compatible with both a homodyne or a hetero-
dyne detection and corresponds to the technique detailed
in Appendix C 1 while the latter, which is more efficient
in terms of resources, is only compatible with a hetero-
dyne detection (and is detailed in Appendix C 2). These
schemes include the active symmetrization introduced in
Appendix F.
1. Fully Gaussian modulation
The full protocol is the following:
• Alice draws 2n random variables x1, x2, · · · , x2n
from a centered normal distribution with the ap-
propriate variance. These form a vector x ∈ R2n.
• Alice sends the states |α1〉, · · · , |αk〉, · · · , |αn〉 to
Bob, with |αk〉 = |x2k + ix2k+1〉.
• Bob receives the states after the quantum channel
and measures them, with either a homodyne de-
tection or a heterodyne detection. In the case of a
heterodyne detection, he obtains a 2n-dimensional
vector y. In the case of a homodyne detection, he
obtains an n-dimensional vector y, then informs Al-
ice about his choices of measured quadratures (x
or p for each state); Alice only keeps the relevant
coordinates in her data in order to form a new n-
dimensional vector x.
• Alice randomly draws a random orthogonal trans-
formation R from the orthogonal group O(2n) (or
O(n) for a homodyne detection). In theory, to
achieve a perfect symmetrization of the state, Alice
should draw R with the Haar measure on O(2n).
However, in practice, R can be chosen uniformly
in a well-chosen subset of O(2n) which has the ad-
vantage of allowing for efficient descriptions of its
elements, such as one of the measures µk defined in
Appendix F.
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• Alice describes R to Bob through the classical com-
munication channel, and both parties apply R to
their respective vector, hence obtaining x′ = Rx
and y′ = Ry.
• Alice chooses randomly nPE coordinates that are
used for parameter estimation.
• The next step is where lies the novelty of our pro-
tocols. For instance, in the so-called four-state
protocol, Alice considers the coordinates x′k which
were not used for parameter estimation and keeps
only the ones such that |x′k| is sufficiently close to
a predetermined value. In the case of the eight-
dimensional protocol (with heterodyne detection
for instance), Alice divides her data into blocks of
size 8 and keeps the blocks for which the euclidean
norm is close to a predetermined value (see Ap-
pendix C 1 for details). Alice informs Bob of the
indices that she keeps. The rest of the data are dis-
carded. At this point, Alice and Bob have classi-
cal correlations for which an efficient reconciliation
protocol is available (see Appendix B).
2. Non-Gaussian modulation and decoy states
In this scheme, the positions of the states used for pa-
rameter estimation are chosen randomly beforehand by
Alice. Let us consider for simplicity the case of the eight-
dimensional protocol.
• Alice draws n 8-dimensional random vectors, each
chosen from one of the three following distributions:
random vectors on the 7-dimensional sphere with
the appropriate radius (these data correspond to
the non-Gaussian modulation which will be used
for the key distillation), random vectors on the 7-
dimensional sphere with an appropriately fluctuat-
ing radius (these are the decoy states which will be
discarded at the end of the protocol: the mixture
of these states with the previous ones should be in-
distinguishable from a true Gaussian distribution)
or Gaussian vectors which are used for parameter
estimation. Alice hence obtains an 8n-dimensional
vector x for which each subset of length 8 corre-
sponds either to legitimate information, decoy data
that will be discarded or data used for parameter
estimation.
• Alice randomly draws a random orthogonal trans-
formation R from the orthogonal group O(8n). In
theory, to achieve a perfect symmetrization of the
state, Alice should draw R with the Haar measure
on O(8n). However, in practice, R can be chosen
uniformly in a well-chosen subset of O(2n) which
has the advantage of allowing for efficient descrip-
tions of its elements, such as one of the measures
µk defined in Appendix F.
• Alice computes the vector x′ = Rx, which is the im-
age of x by the orthogonal transformation R and
uses this vector for her modulation. Hence she
sends the states |α1〉, · · · , |αk〉, · · · , |α4n〉 to Bob,
with |αk〉 = |x′2k + ix′2k+1〉.
• Bob receives the states after the quantum channel
and measures them, with a heterodyne detection.
He obtains an 8n-dimensional vector y′.
• Alice describes R to Bob through the classical com-
munication channel. Bob applies R−1 to his vector
y′ and obtains y = R−1y′.
• Alice reveals which subsets of length eight should
be kept for the key distillation, which ones should
be discarded (as they correspond to decoy states)
and which ones should be used for parameter esti-
mation.
• At this point, Alice and Bob have classical correla-
tions for which an efficient reconciliation protocol
is available (see Appendix B).
